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WHAT IS THE BEARING OF THINKING ON DOING? 
Marshall Bierson and John Schwenkler 
 
Imagine that, while looking out of my front window, I see you surreptitiously remove mail from 
my neighbour’s mailbox. What have I witnessed? I may have seen you stealing my neighbour’s 
mail. But then again, I may instead have seen you do a favour for my neighbour by collecting her 
mail while she is away on vacation. This description of what I saw is indeterminate between 
whether you were stealing the mail or collecting it for safekeeping. Certainly, the description 
gives clues to which of these things was happening—for instance, the surreptitiousness of your 
behaviour is plausibly suggestive of theft. Yet while theft is often furtive, it is not the stealth that 
determines whether taking something amounts to stealing it.  After all, there are suave thieves 
who don’t bother to hide their behaviour, just as there are clandestine saints who are concerned 
only for their treasure in heaven. 
The way to eliminate the ambiguity in our story is to add more information to it. For 
example, if we add to the description above that (1) my neighbour asked you to collect the mail 
and (2) you intend to give all the mail back to the neighbour when she returns from vacation, 
then the story did not involve stealing. By contrast, if instead of (2) we added that (3) you picked 
up the mail intending to keep whatever looks interesting, passing off the remainder as the 
complete collection, then our story may involve an act of theft. 
Yet clearly I did not witness any of these further facts while looking out of my window 
and watching you take my neighbour’s mail. I was not there when my neighbour asked you to 
pick the mail up for her, and I certainly did not see the intention with which you collected it. Nor 
could I see any number of the other facts that are relevant to the description of what you did. I 
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could not peer through the outer mailbox and into the true normative relations that hold between 
the letters and their proper owner, or glance into your mind to see whether or not you mistakenly 
thought the mail your own. Yet each of these unobserved facts bears on the correct classification 
of your act. 
This sort of indeterminacy is suggestive to philosophers. The description of what I saw, 
while accurate as far as it goes, fails to determine whether or not what I saw was an act of theft. 
Therefore, one might conclude, what I really saw must not have been you stealing the mail or 
taking it for safekeeping, but only a bunch of physical happenings.1 What happened ‘out in the 
world’ was just that you moved the mail out of the mailbox and into your house (or, perhaps, that 
the movement of a medium sized collection of atoms caused a tiny collection of atoms to move 
from one place to another).2 The theft, if it occurred, was not itself a worldly, physical process. 
An act of theft is somehow composite—it consists in the combination of physical, observable, 
worldly facts and certain further mental and normative ones. 
What we can say about theft, we can say about the majority of our ways of describing 
human action. What happens ‘out in the world’ when someone intentionally launches down a 
slip-n-slide might be in many essential respects the same as what happens ‘out in the world’ 
when someone trips and skids: so intentional launchings are not purely physical, observable, 
worldly events, but causal compounds of physical events and their mental antecedents and 
 
1 The label ‘Cartesian’ is overused, but in the present case it is clearly appropriate: ‘... if I look out of the 
window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men 
themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal 
automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact 
grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind.’ (René Descartes, ‘Second Meditation’, in 
Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies, trans. John Cottingham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 21. Our focus in this chapter is not on issues in the philosophy of 
perception, but for dissenting views see Jennifer Hornsby, Simple Mindedness (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001) and Grace Helton, ‘Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Other’,’ The Philosophical Quarterly 68 
(2018), 243-264. 
2 We consider what is at stake in deciding between these two forms of description in Part II of our chapter. 
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accompaniments. If the on-duty pilot and I are both asleep in our cabins, then we are doing the 
very same thing when our ship hits an iceberg. Yet it was the pilot, and not I, who sunk the ship: 
so sinking the ship was not a purely physical event, but a compound of what actually happened 
and some social and normative facts pertaining to the pilot’s social role and consequent 
responsibilities. You and I could both sign the same form, and yet, because you were deceived 
about its content, only one of us may consent to undergoing an operation. Therefore, consent is 
not an act that happens ‘in the world’, by uttering certain sounds or making certain marks, but a 
compound of such bodily movements and an understanding of what they amount to. 
Central to Elizabeth Anscombe’s work in the philosophy of action is a rejection of this 
style of reasoning and the view of bodily action that it is taken to support. According to 
Anscombe, it is ‘absurd to say that “A and B got married” … and similar propositions, are not 
reports of physical facts, of physical (historical) events, things that have taken place in the overt, 
public history of the world.’3 This is not to deny that there is a difference between a theft and a 
favor, a marriage and a mere rehearsal. Anscombe’s claim is that these differences are not a 
matter of what obtains in some separate mental and normative realms, but are differences in what 
happens when the relevant things are done. Despite this, a witness to an action could be mistaken 
about what she actually sees. I might think I’m witnessing a beach wedding when I’m actually 
watching a peculiar flash mob. Nevertheless I am witnessing one or the other, a marriage or a 
mob. That which is there in the overt world, present before my eyes, is more than a bunch of 
bodily movements. 
 
3 G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘On Promising and its Justice, and whether it need be respected in foro interno’ 
(1969), repr. in Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume III: Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1981), p. 11. 
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A consequence of this position is that the correct description of physical facts, i.e. facts 
about what happens in the world, sometimes depends on such things as what a person thinks, 
what a person has been told, or the particularities of custom and positive law pertaining to things 
such as marriage and theft. For Anscombe, articulating the nature of this dependency is one of 
the central tasks of philosophical psychology. It is by this special dependency that actions, as 
described by biologists, anthropologists, and philosophers, are marked off from mere events, as 
studied by chemists and physicists. This dependency is also important for clarifying issues in 
ethical theory. There are, of course, important ethical differences between a deliberate murder 
and a botched appendectomy, or between mortally sinful adultery and good faith 
misunderstandign of one’s marital status. It is therefore unsurprising that Anscombe, in the years 
between the first edition of Intention (1957) and the appearance of ‘On Promising and Its Justice’ 
(1969), was preoccupied with articulating the way that the nature of an action can depend on 
normative, social, and psychological facts. 
First in Intention, later in ‘Pretending’ (1958), ‘On Brute Facts’ (1958), ‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy’ (1958), ‘On Being in Good Faith’ (late 1950s or early 1960s), ‘On Authority in 
Morals’ (1962), and ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’ (1963), and finally in ‘On Promising 
and Its Justice’, Anscombe works to systematise the various ways in which facts about the wider 
context of an action make a difference to the true description of what a person does. In addition 
to her published work, this question was also a central preoccupation of many of the handwritten 
notes and unpublished (and unfortunately undated) drafts contained in the archive of her papers 
held by the Collegium Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. By looking at this body of 
work holistically, we can discern the central theoretical commitments in Anscombe’s 
understanding of what we will call the bearing of thinking on doing. 
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The remainder of this chapter will survey a decade of Anscombe’s often seemingly 
idiosyncratic insights and examples, and translate them into a systematic overview of her 
position. We proceed in three steps. Part I distinguishes two ways that the description of an 
action can depend on its wider context, which we call circumstantial and classificatory 
dependency. The subsequent sections relate these two types of dependency to the question of 
how thinking bears on doing. Part II considers several ways that the description of what an agent 
does can depend on what the agent in fact thinks, and Part III how this can depend as well on 
what the agent should have thought, even if in fact she did not. 
 
I. Circumstance and Classification 
In her early paper ‘On Brute Facts’, Anscombe illustrates the distinction between circumstantial 
and classificatory dependency with the example of owing a grocer money for potatoes.4 If 
someone asks me, ‘Why do you owe the grocer four pounds?’ I might answer by citing facts like 
‘He delivered me the two kilograms of potatoes that I had ordered last Tuesday’, and ‘The 
potatoes cost 4 pounds’. Anscombe contrasts ‘these facts’ about what transpired with what she 
calls institutional facts, such as the fact that in our social institutions such a pattern of exchange 
results in my having a financial debt. It is certainly true that, had these institutional facts been 
different, the same first-order facts could have obtained without my owing the grocer anything at 
all. For we could imagine very different property norms according to which the same ‘facts on 
the ground’ would not entail that I owe the grocer any money: for instance, those that would 
govern the exchange of goods in a society in which, because food is necessary for survival, all 
 
4 G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘On Brute Facts’ (1958), repr. in Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume III: 
Ethics, Religion, and Politics, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 22-25; at pp. 23-24. (Also compare Anscombe, 
‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958), repr. in Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume III: Ethics, Religion, and 
Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 26-42; at p. 28.) 
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food prices are merely suggested donations; or in a highly legalistic society where the fact that 
the grocer did not have the bill notarised voided the contract. Anscombe argues, however, that 
there is a difference between the way my owing money to the grocer depends on the facts of the 
exchange and the way this debt depends on the social institutions in which this exchange takes 
place. Here is how she introduces the latter form of dependency, which is the one we will call 
classificatory: 
 
Does my owing the grocer in this case consist in any facts beyond the ones just 
mentioned [viz., that I asked for the potatoes and the grocer delivered them and sent me a 
bill]? No. Someone may want to say: it consists in these facts in the context of our 
institutions. This is correct in a way. But we must be careful, so to speak, to bracket that 
analysis correctly. That is, we must say, not: It consists in these-facts-holding-in-the-
context-of-our-institutions, but: It consists in these facts – in the context of our 
institutions, or: In the context of our institutions it consists in these facts. For the 
statement that I owe the grocer does not contain a description of our institutions, any 
more than the statement that I gave someone a shilling contains a description of the 
institution of money and of the currency of this country.5 
 
While it is helpful to employ a formalism in order to help keep track of these distinctions, 
Anscombe’s way of doing this is a bit unwieldy, and so we will represent these classificatory 
dependencies as functions instead. On a first pass, a classificatory dependency can be 
represented with a function that takes certain inputs, e.g., that I asked the grocer for the potatoes 
 
5 ‘On Brute Facts’, p. 22 
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and he delivered them to me and sent me a bill, and returns from them an output, e.g., that I owe 
the grocer four pounds. Applied to the present case, the function would be as follows: 
 
f customary norms of exchange (I requested £4 worth of potatoes, and the grocer delivered the 
appropriate quantity and sent me a bill) = I owe the grocer four pounds 
 
The purpose of this apparatus is to help us keep separate the roles played by what we have so far 
identified as the ‘facts on the ground’, i.e. those that concern what happens in the course of 
events, which are represented here as inputs to the function f customary norms of exchange , and the 
classificatory functions themselves, in virtue of which those inputs result in something further—
in the present case, that I owe the grocer a certain sum of money. In the context of different 
institutions, such as one in which the bill from the grocer was void unless I signed it upon 
receipt, these same things could have happened without my thereby owing four pounds to the 
grocer. The description of what happens does not include a description of the institutions within 
which it takes place, though it is only against the background of those institutions that it amounts 
to a description of my coming to owe money to the grocer. 
We can distinguish, then, two kinds of dependency. There is circumstantial dependency, 
illustrated here in the way that my owing the grocer depends on the grocer having delivered the 
potatoes, and so on, and classificatory dependency, illustrated here in the way that our customary 
norms classify these circumstances as an exchange which results in my owing money to the 
grocer. However, it is not only local customs and institutional norms that provide a wider context 
within which certain happenings may result or fail to result in something further. Here is another 
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of Anscombe’s examples of circumstantial dependency, from the paragraph following the one 
just quoted: 
 
Given this background [viz., that of our customary norms of exchange], these facts [viz., 
that I asked for the potatoes and the grocer delivered them, etc.] do not necessarily 
amount to my owing the grocer such-and-such a sum. For the transaction might have 
been arranged as part of an amateur film production. Then perhaps I have said to the 
grocer ‘Send so many potatoes’ and he has sent them, and he has sent a bill – but the 
whole procedure was not a real sale but a piece of acting; even though it so happens that I 
then eat the potatoes (not as part of the film): for perhaps the grocer has said I can keep 
them; or has said nothing but doesn’t care, and the question never comes up. Thus the 
fact that something is done in a society with certain institutions, in the context of which it 
ordinarily amounts to such-and-such a transaction, is not absolute proof that such-and-
such a transaction has taken place.6  
 
There are two lessons to draw from this case. One, which we will discuss at more length below, 
is that the logic of a classificatory function will usually not be such as to entail that its output 
obtains, given that its inputs do: for there will be an indefinite number of possible special 
circumstances, the obtaining of which would keep this entailment from going through. Second, 
notice that the ‘context’ that Anscombe discusses in this quotation plays a different role in 
determining what results from certain happenings than do the institutional norms discussed 
above: for here we have a case in which both those happenings and the surrounding norms of 
 
6 ‘On Brute Facts’, p. 22. 
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exchange are held constant, and nevertheless there is a difference in what comes about. Other 
cases have a similar structure: for example, there can be many different sets of house rules that 
determine what happens when a player lands on ‘Free Parking’ in a game of Monopoly, but in 
addition it is only if a person is playing Monopoly that her rolling a die and moving her piece the 
corresponding number of spaces to the square marked ‘Free Parking’ counts as her landing her 
piece on that square. This suggests that the inputs to a classificatory function will often make at 
least an implicit reference to the wider context of the events that they describe, in virtue of which 
the operative institutional norms then have application to them. Of course, in many cases the 
explicit description that can be given of the wider context of an action won’t itself be very 
informative—indeed, it might say only that the context of what happened was the ordinary one. 
Nevertheless, that something was done in an ordinary context may be one of the circumstantial 
facts upon which further descriptions of her action depend. 
Before we go on to generalise this machinery, it is important to clarify a few points. First, 
notice that where it is natural to distinguish what happened from the wider context in which it 
took place will sometimes depend on our particular explanatory interests, and the distinction will 
not always be perfectly sharp. For example, if Helen moves her piece six squares ahead on the 
Monopoly board in order to show her younger sister how to play, then because her move was 
merely illustrative she won’t receive the consequences of the square that she landed on. Is the 
difference between this case and the one where Helen ‘really’ moves her piece a difference in 
what is done, or is it rather a difference in the wider context? One can imagine situations in 
which either answer would be acceptable, as well as others where it is hard to see what the point 
of the distinction would be.7 Similarly, in some situations the description we give of what 
 
7 Here it helps to compare what Anscombe says about reasons and causes in section 17 of Intention. 
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happens might depend on the norms it was subject to: someone who lays down a certain card 
during a game of Bridge might be described as doing a different thing, say trumping, than 
someone who lays down the same card while playing Hearts. Second, let us reiterate that 
functions that pertain to the description of an action differ from mathematical functions in that 
the facts that are input to the function are not logically sufficient conditions for their output. As 
we have seen, Anscombe thinks that in many institutional contexts there are indefinitely many 
special circumstances that might block a given classificatory inference. For instance, if the 
exchange of potatoes from our earlier example occurred in a play, then one actor does not really 
owe the other any money. This will be true even if one of the actors really is a grocer and 
brought the prop-produce from their store. Nevertheless, when someone asks why I owe the 
grocer four pounds, we generally think there is no need to mention that the exchange did not 
occur as part of a play (and indeed, it would be impossible to list all the possible exceptions that 
might have kept the inference from going through). 
Finally, we note that a helpful feature of our formalism is the way it makes it possible to 
represent how one classificatory dependency may be embedded within another. Consider, for 
example, the following two functions: 
 
f norms of marriage (A and B took part in a public ceremony in which they exchanged a vow of 
lifelong fidelity) = A and B are married 
f moral law (A and B are married, and A had sexual intercourse with someone other than B) 
= A committed adultery 
 
11 
These functions are related, as the first one identifies a condition that can be treated as an input 
to the second. However, it is helpful to represent them as separate functions since doing so 
allows us to distinguish the different sorts of mistakes a person may make in considering the 
proper description of what she does. For example, a person who thinks that two people who have 
publicly exchanged a vow of lifelong fidelity are no longer married if they have subsequently 
fallen out of love and lived apart from each other for a year may mistakenly think that she is not 
married to someone even though they exchanged vows in a marriage ceremony and have not 
formally divorced. Alternatively, a person might accept the above classification of marriage but 
think that that, as long as her spouse has consented to it, having intercourse with another person 
is not really an act of adultery. The first sort of person rejects the classification of marriage 
represented in our function f norms of marriage , while the second rejects the classification of adultery 
represented in f moral law . On Anscombe’s view (and ours), both of these positions are mistaken, 
but it is not hard to imagine how someone could come to endorse them. 
It is useful to have this conceptual background in place when we consider Anscombe’s 
views about the bearing of thinking on doing, as the distinction between circumstantial and 
classificatory dependency is central to her account. Nevertheless, we have not yet uncovered 
Anscombe’s most interesting insights. The real philosophical work comes in when we try to 
explain the way that the classification of what an agent does can depend in a circumstantial way 
on what the agent thinks or is responsible for thinking.  
 
II. Thought 
A central aim of Anscombe’s Intention is to distinguish what she calls the special ‘form of 
description’ that we bring to bear in characterizing events as voluntary or intentional actions, 
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from the quite different form that events are described in when there is no such reference to 
purposive agency. This contrast is marked initially in the distinction between two senses in 
which the question ‘Why?’ may ask for an explanation of what happens:8 on the one hand there 
is the use of ‘Why?’ to ask for someone’s reasons for acting, i.e., the considerations suggesting 
that her action was something ‘good to make happen with a view to an objective, or with a view 
to a sound objective’;9 and on the other there is the sense in which ‘Why?’ seeks to identify the 
causes of what takes place. The distinction reappears in different guises later in the book, first in 
Anscombe’s discussion in Sections 20-27 of the ‘A–D order’ that represents how in an action 
means are taken to a further end, and later on in her account in Sections 33-44 of practical 
reasoning as the calculation of means to an end. Finally, it is toward the end of Intention that 
Anscombe articulates this distinction in terms of two different ‘forms of description’, one of 
which characterizes events simply as ‘the movements of humans’10 and the various further 
‘things effected by’ these movements,11 while the other is ‘the description of what happens as a 
human action’,12 or the kind of description we would give if our aim were to provide ‘the history 
of a human being’s day or life’.13 The two columns in her list of action words in Section 47 of 
Intention provide examples of the latter category:14 for in describing someone as, say, intruding 
on a private meeting, offending her coworker, kicking a stone, dropping her silverware, switching 
on or off a light, and placing down her bag or arranging papers on her desk; or again as 
telephoning her cousin, calling her daughter to breakfast, groping in the dark for her glasses, 
 
8 For this discussion see G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed. (1963), repr. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press (2000), §§6-18. 
9 Intention, p. 4. 
10 Intention, p. 83. 
11 Intention, p. 85. 
12 Intention, p. 83; emphasis added. 
13 Intention, p. 85. 
14 Intention, p. 85. 
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signing a contract, paying for her lunch, and hiring a gardener or contracting to have her house 
painted, we are bringing her movements under concepts ‘which go beyond physics’ and ‘are 
basically at least animal’.15 
 That descriptions of this sort are presented, in the first place, as ‘vital descriptions’ or 
descriptions of ‘characteristically animal movements’,16 rather than by emphasizing the way that 
special concepts like ‘telephoning’ or ‘writing a sentence on the blackboard’17 make reference to 
specifically human capacities, institutions, and forms of life, is an important point to emphasize 
in the present context, as is the account Anscombe gives of what makes a movement 
‘characteristically animal’: it is a movement ‘with a normal role in the sensitive, and therefore 
appetitive, life of animals’.18 She gives several examples to illustrate the way that our 
descriptions of the movement of animals depends on the presence of sensation and appetite: 
 
A dog’s curled tail might have something stuck in it, but that of itself would not make us 
speak of the dog as holding the object with its tail; but if he has taken between his teeth 
and kept there some moderate-sized object, he is holding it.19 
 
… we describe what [animals] do in a manner perfectly characteristic of the use of 
intention concepts: we describe what further they are doing in doing something (the latter 
description being more immediate, nearer to the merely physical): the cat is stalking the 
bird in crouching and slinking along with its eye fixed on the bird and its whiskers 
 
15 Intention, p. 86. 
16 Intention, p. 86. 
17 Intention, p. 84. 
18 Intention, p. 86. 
19 Intention, p. 86. 
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twitching. The enlarged description of what the cat is doing is not all that characterises it 
as an intention (for enlarged descriptions are possible of any event that has describable 
effects), but to this is added the cat’s perception of the bird and what it does if it catches 
it. The two features, knowledge and enlarged description, are quite characteristic of 
description of intention in acting. Just as we naturally say, ‘The cat thinks there is a 
mouse coming’, so we also naturally ask: Why is the cat crouching and slinking like that? 
And give the answer: It’s stalking that bird; see, its eye is fixed on it. We do this, though 
the cat can utter no thoughts, and cannot give expression to any knowledge of its action, 
or to any intentions either.20 
 
The constitutive role of sensation and appetite is easiest to see in Anscombe’s second case: for a 
cat is not described as stalking a bird if it merely happens to be crouching and slinking in the 
grass behind one (say as a trained trick), but only if it is doing this sort of thing because it sees 
the bird and wants to catch it. That is, it is only within such a wider context that an ‘enlarged 
description’ like stalking the bird can have application to the movements of a cat. But a similar 
point applies, at an even more fundamental level, to her case of the dog that holds an object in its 
mouth, as for this to happen is not just for the object to be held in the dog’s mouth in the way 
that a rock may be held in a cleft, but rather for the dog to keep the object in its mouth because it 
knows the object is there and wants it to remain. A similar point applies in turn to the phrase 
‘taken between his teeth’, as this description conveys something more than an object’s simply 
having gotten stuck there.21 (That is why talk of wind or water as ‘picking up’, ‘putting down’, 
 
20 Intention, pp. 86-87. 
21 It applies as well to Anscombe’s description of the cat as ‘crouching’ and ‘slinking’, as even these 
‘immediate’ descriptions say more than just that the cat’s body is moving around in certain ways—for they too are 
descriptions that ‘go beyond physics’. 
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‘carrying’, etc. is necessarily analogical: with inanimate forces there is no room to distinguish 
between, say, lifting something and merely happening to move in a way that causes the thing to 
rise.) In describing the movements of humans and other animals we consistently draw on words 
and phrases that ‘are formally descriptions of executed intentions’:22 these terms ‘describe what 
further [an agent] is doing in doing something’,23 and the applicability of these further 
descriptions depends on the agent’s own perceptions and desires, as well as on assumptions 
about what the agent will do if a certain desire is or is not fulfilled. 
It would be a mistake to conclude from this that in describing a cat as stalking a bird, or a 
dog as holding something in its teeth, we are postulating some psychological states that 
accompany the animal’s observable behaviour in a way that renders the latter voluntary or 
intentional under certain descriptions. This is a point that Anscombe makes early on in Intention, 
when she has us imagine walking in to her room to find her ‘sitting in a chair writing’:24 
Anscombe says that such a description will ‘in general’ be the ‘first account’ a person would 
give ‘of what [she] was doing’25—and to give such an account is to give an account of something 
that is happening in the room one enters. Yet the description of a person as writing, rather than 
of, say, ‘how [she] was affecting the acoustic properties of the room’,26 is not a description to 
which there corresponds ‘a picked-out set of movements’27 of a sort we have found that writing 
usually involves. Rather, the best way we have to describe the bodily movements that writing 
involves is to say that they are the sort of movements involved: in writing. And we would have 
 
22 Intention, p. 87. 
23 Intention, p. 87. 
24 Intention, p. 8. 
25 Intention, p. 8. 
26 Intention, p. 8. 
27 Intention, p. 83. 
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no interest in picking out movements of this sort if not for the role that they usually play in this 
special form of self-conscious expression. Moreover, as we have seen, even the ‘immediate’ 
description of a person as holding a pen or moving her hand around already draws on concepts 
of characteristically animal movement whose applicability presupposes the presence of 
perception and desire. There is no ‘fundamental description[…] of what occurs—such as the 
movements of muscles or molecules’ which when suitably accompanied by certain psychological 
states make for an event of someone’s writing: rather, in describing someone’s actions ‘[t]he 
only events to consider are intentional actions themselves’.28 
We should notice, however, that there is an important difference between the way that an 
animal’s ‘knowledge of its own action’29 bears on the applicability of descriptions like ‘kicking’, 
‘dropping’, ‘holding’, and ‘stalking’, and the further kind of self-knowledge that is presupposed 
by descriptions like ‘building a house’ or ‘writing a sentence on a blackboard’.30 In ‘The Two 
Kinds of Error in Action’, Anscombe illustrates the latter sort of dependency with the example of 
consenting to a contract: ‘Consent’, she writes, ‘is consent to something’, and that which is 
consented to must be apprehended by the person who consents to it.31 But this intellectual 
apprehension is different from the kind of apprehension involved in picking something up or 
holding it in one’s mouth: for while the verbs ‘pick up’ and ‘hold’ necessarily take a direct 
object, and so picking up and holding are necessarily picking up and holding something which 
the agent must perceive and desire to possess, the descriptions under which a person represents 
an object that she picks up or holds is irrelevant to the descriptions we may give of her as doing 
 
28 Intention, p. 29. 
29 Intention, p. 87. 
30 Intention, p. 84. 
31 G. E. M. Anscombe,‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’ (1963), repr. in in Collected Philosophical 
Papers, Volume III: Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 3-9; at p. 3. 
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this.32 By contrast, at least in the usual case a person writing a sentence must know what sentence 
she is writing, a person building a house must know what it is that she is building, and a person 
consenting to a contrast must know what it is that she is consenting to. The applicability of these 
descriptions depends on the agent herself bringing her action under them. 
Three important points require clarification. First, it is possible for there to be cases in 
which a person unwittingly writes a given sentence or participates in the building of a house, say 
because she is following orders or instructions whose purpose she doesn’t understand. Notice, 
however, that in such a case the description of the agent as doing the relevant thing depends on 
the presence of that description in the order or instruction that the agent follows: thus someone 
writing down symbols that are being fed to her randomly is not thereby writing whatever 
sentence those symbols may eventually happen to form. Second, it is possible to say that an 
agent has done a thing of this second sort even if she has done it unwittingly, as for example a 
monkey might produce a Shakespearean sonnet by pushing keys on a typewriter. However, the 
description of a person as presently doing such a thing does not depend on what she has already 
done, nor on what she is eventually going to do: for a person may be writing a certain thing, say 
the word ‘intention’, at least as soon as she has made the first mark, and even if lightning strikes 
before she gets to the end.33 The applicability of this wider description depends on the agent’s 
own understanding of what she is up to, or on the content of the instruction or order she is 
following. Finally, we wish to emphasize that the distinction that interests us here is not simply a 
 
32 In her archival notes Anscombe puts the point like this: ‘we can only define this class; actions via 
intention. Intention (in what happens) implies agency, however lack of intention doesn’t imply non-agency. If I spill 
coffee thinking it tea I don’t spill coffee intentionally. This means: a man is the agent of an act if what he does can 
be described under an aspect that makes it intentional’ (Archive, Box F5, File 509, p. 121). 
33 This has been helpfully emphasized by Michael Thompson: see his Life and Action (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), Part II; and ‘Anscombe’s Intention and Practical Knowledge’, in A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and 
F. Stoutland, eds., Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 198-210. 
. 
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matter of cognitive sophistication: for just as our remarks about concepts like ‘picking up’ and 
‘holding’ apply equally well to rational agents, and so to describe, for example, a bird as building 
a nest or a beaver a dam may presuppose that this animal has, not necessarily ‘in mind’ but as 
something that informs what it does, an understanding of what the finished product will be like.34 
The two kinds of dependency we have just discussed can be represented using the 
formalism introduced in Part I. First, in the case of concepts of animal movement like ‘walk’, 
‘stalk’, ‘pick up’, and ‘hold’, our suggestion is that among the circumstantial facts that these 
classifications depend on are facts about the acting animal’s thoughts, perceptions, and desires. 
For example, the description ‘A stalks B’ is not sufficiently represented just with the function f 
folk zoology (A moves quietly in a path that follows the path of B), but requires further that A does 
this because it perceives B and wants to catch it. (This is not to deny that we can use the word 
‘stalk’ to describe what happens in the absence of these further circumstances—the point is 
rather that our ordinary use of the word makes implicit appeal to a wider context.) Second, in the 
case of special concepts like ‘consent’, ‘write’, and ‘marry’, the circumstantial facts that these 
classifications depend on include the agent’s knowledge of the classificatory fact itself: thus the 
function f norms of marriage that we introduced in Part I is in fact incomplete, as it is missing the 
crucial circumstance that in exchanging this vow A and B knew that they were thereby getting 
married. If instead A thought that the ceremony he was participating in was only a rehearsal, or 
that the vows they were taking didn’t hold any official status, such that they could be dissolved 
 
34 This point is a bit tricky. For example, a bird could build a nest just by executing an internal ‘program’ 
that has it pick up one piece of material after another and arrange them in the appropriate manner. That the bird 
stops when the nest is done doesn’t require it to have had any representation of what a finished nest would look like. 
The remarks above are meant to mark a possibility rather than put it forward as the appropriate description of what 
actually happens. 
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in the future just by deciding to go their own ways, then A and B will not have gotten married at 
all. 
This last point needs to be handled with care. First, note that we are not treating the 
knowledge that one is doing X (getting married, say, or signing a contract) as a matter of 
applying the word ‘X’ to what one is doing: for people can get married who do not speak 
English, or even in cultures that do not have any special word for this institution.35 (This point 
will not apply to descriptions like ‘writing such-and-such a word’, for obvious reasons.) Rather, 
in cases like these the essential thing is that the agent has an understanding of the normative 
upshot of what she does: thus a person getting married will have to understand the obligations 
that come with marriage, the permanence of this institution, and its status as a civic institution 
rather than a mere personal pact; a person signing a contract will have to understand her 
obligation to do what the contract describes; and so on. Second, as this characterization suggests 
the knowledge that these actions depend on may come in degrees, and sometimes there will be 
borderline cases where it is hard to say whether or not a person knew enough of what she was 
doing to count as doing such-and-such. Finally, we grant that in practice the mere fact that, for 
example, a person who took part in a marriage ceremony failed to understand the permanence or 
civic status of marriage might not be a sufficient reason to regard their marriage as null and 
void—though it would be good grounds for subsequent annulment or divorce. Similarly, a 
person who writes in an email message that she’ll do something may in practice be treated as 
 
35 However, we find it difficult to see how there could be a workable set of customs in which knowledge of 
what one was doing was not a requirement of getting married. One thing to bear in mind here is that we are talking 
specifically about ceremonial marriage, as opposed to the way people may become married as a matter of common 
law, say by having lived together for such-and-such a time. And it seems essential to the very idea of a marriage 
ceremony that it involve a contract, promise, or other expression of commitment to the person one is marrying. As 
we discuss below, however, there is a strong case that promising is essentially something a person cannot do without 
knowing that she is doing this. 
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having contracted to do this even if she didn’t understand that her emailed statement was 
binding. However, this does not show that actions like these do not depend on knowledge of 
what one is doing. The reason for these practices is rather that a person’s claim not to have 
known something is defeasible—she could be lying or misremembering. Because of this, the 
claim ‘I didn’t know’ cannot always be treated as sufficient to dissolve one’s obligations even 
when what one says would, if true, suffice to show them illusory. 
An important consequence of this account is that the force of a claim not to have known 
what one was doing will differ depending on what kind of action one was engaged in. Where 
mere concepts of animal movement are concerned, the claim ‘I did not know I was doing that!’ 
functions, as Anscombe observes in Intention,36 as a way of saying that one did not do the thing 
in question intentionally or on purpose, even if one may in fact have done it. For Anscombe, the 
case of adultery falls in this category as well on her analysis: the fact that X did not know that Y 
was not his spouse does not show that X did not commit adultery in having intercourse with Y, 
though in most cases it will be enough to show that he was not responsible for doing this. (We 
will consider this concept of ‘responsibility’ shortly.) In ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’ she 
uses Thomas Aquinas’ language of ‘formal’ and ‘material’ objects to explain this contrast: if X 
believes that Y is his spouse but in fact she is not, then X commits adultery materially but not 
formally, just as a hunter who mistakes his father for a stag aims formally at a stag but materially 
at his father.37 By contrast, Anscombe observes that the claim that one did not know she was 
 
36 Intention, pp. 11-12. 
37 ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, p. 5. The case of a man shooting his father is due to St. Thomas 
Aquinas: see Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q. 6, a. 8, c. For the language of formal vs. material objects of will, see ST 
IaIIae, q. 18, a. 6, c. (We thank Daniel De Haan for the latter reference.) In the present context, the language of what 
is done formally, or of the formal object of knowledge or the will, is equivalent to that of intentional action and 
intentional object. For related discussion see Jennifery Frey and Christopher Frey’s important paper, ‘G.E.M. 
Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action’, Analytic Philosophy 58 (2017), 202-247. 
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participating in a real marriage ceremony rather than a rehearsal, or signing a contract that 
committed her to do X, is a way of saying that one did not do the thing in question at all (not 
even ‘materially’ or by accident), since without this knowledge an act of the relevant sort simply 
cannot have taken place.38 And she argues as well that there is a third category other than these 
two, in which the description of an agent as doing something depends on her knowledge of what 
she is doing, though not under the very description in question. She illustrates this category with 
the examples of theft and murder, which she argues ‘are so used that formality is essential to 
them; it is built into their meaning’.39 Yet the way that formality is essential to these concepts is 
different from the way it is essential to those of marriage and promising, as it concerns 
knowledge of the circumstances of one’s action rather than of the appropriate classification of 
them. For example, she writes that what makes us say a person did not steal in taking someone 
else’s property is that the person ‘genuinely and reasonably, but wrongly, thought that this was 
property he had a right to take away’40—as, for example, when a traveler at the airport mistakes 
someone else’s suitcase for her own. A similar point holds in the case of murder: 
 
You have to think you are making a contract in order to be doing so, whereas you 
do not have to think that what you do is murder in order for it to be murder. What is 
necessary for your action to be murder is that you deliberately do such-and-such; this 
entails that you know you are doing such-and-such.41 
 
 
38 Of course a person can marry someone, X, not knowing that X falls under a further description (‘a 
pauper’, say). In such a case we might say that the person married a pauper unintentionally. But still it presupposes 
(‘de re’) knowledge of marrying X. 
39 ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, p. 5. 
40 ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, p. 5. 
41 ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, p. 5. 
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The distinction that Anscombe is drawing here can be represented using our formalism. One of 
the circumstantial inputs necessary for the function f norms of marriage to classify A and B as getting 
married is that A and B bring what they are doing under the very concept that this function 
represents. By contrast, the corresponding circumstantial input necessary for the function f moral 
law to classify A as murdering someone is that A knows that what she is doing falls under the 
other descriptions that this function takes as input: most obviously, A must know that she is 
killing an innocent person. According to this analysis, a person can murder someone even if she 
thinks, perhaps because the act is committed in the context of a war, that to act in this way is not 
really to commit an act of murder at all. Similarly, the definition of theft requires that the agent 
know that she is taking as her possession something that belongs to another person, but not that 
she know that, in doing this, she is stealing. 
This brings us back to the brink of a pressing philosophical question. It seems clear why 
descriptions like ‘marrying’ and ‘contracting’ should include an agent’s knowledge of her doing 
the thing in question as one of their conditions of application: this is because those words 
describe communicative acts through which a person takes on some special obligations, not as a 
mere consequence of what she does (as when a person who damages another’s property has the 
responsibility of making restitution), but in virtue of a social practice that allows us to obtain 
certain goods by restricting their possibilities for future behaviour.42 Because of this, we cannot 
understand how a person who signs a contract or makes a promise, etc., is thereby committed to 
doing the further things she contracts or promises to do except by seeing the original act as one 
of self-consciously committing herself to do these further things.43 And the relevance of self-
 
42 The foregoing is a very compressed summary of Anscombe’s analysis of promising in ‘On Promising 
and its Justice’. 
43 Some tricky issues arise here. A person who signs a contract carelessly, without knowing what she is 
doing, might have an obligation to have the contract officially voided, or even an obligation to do the very thing that 
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knowledge to the concepts of murder and theft is different from this: in those cases, an agent’s 
knowledge of her action bears on the proper way of holding her accountable, through practices 
of praise and blame, reward and punishment, for doing something, such as killing someone or 
taking another’s property, which she could also have done in ignorance. But then why should it 
be that a person’s knowledge of the circumstances of these acts is a presupposition of holding 
him or her accountable for them? 
 
III. Responsibility 
Certain human actions, like promising, depend on full knowledge of the nature of one’s act. 
Others, like theft, require at least partial knowledge of one’s movements and their wider 
circumstances. These dependencies, however, suggest a troubling moral strategy. To steal is to 
do a terrible thing; similarly, to renege on a promise is to open oneself up for certain censure and 
blame. Therefore, if one can cultivate a special ignorance, say about others’ ownership of objects 
you want and about the classificatory conditions of promising, then one can ensure that she never 
steals or reneges on a promise. Similarly, while one way to avoid sin in war is to carefully adopt 
policies that discriminate between combatants and the innocent, how much easier it would be to 
refrain from ever inquiring into the possible civilian status of your targets, thus insulating 
yourself from the charge of knowledgeably killing the innocent! It thus appears that on 
Anscombe’s own account ‘sufficient thoughtlessness is a safeguard against committing mortal 
 
it describes. But that is not because, in signing the contract, she committed herself to any of this. Rather, to use some 
terminology that we introduce just below, it is because a person who signs a contract is taken to be responsible for 
knowing what it is that she is doing, and so can be held to account for the consequences of her carelessness. In a 
similar way, someone who carelessly makes a statement that is subject to obvious misinterpretation can be held to 
account for misleading her audience even if she didn’t lie in what she said. 
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sin’.44 And this conclusion would be absurd. The military general cannot avoid legitimate moral 
condemnation by maintaining a carefully curated ignorance. Instead, she must do all she can to 
minimise civilian casualties.  
 We can put the general problem as follows. Terms like ‘guilty’, ‘sinful’, ‘blameworthy’, 
‘praiseworthy’, ‘meritorious’, and so on express concepts that have application only to the 
actions of human beings and other rational agents, and not to things done by hurricanes, turtles, 
boulders, and the like. But haven’t we just seen that in general those descriptions endemic to 
rational agents are ones which circumstantially depend on the knowledge of what one does? A 
boulder and I can both tumble down a cliff. A dandelion and I can both grow taller. A dog and I 
can both chase a squirrel. Yet only you and I can write, promise, murder, or marry. The reason 
why only we are capable of the latter is because acts of this sort depend circumstantially on a 
kind of knowledge that is available only to rational creatures. This suggests that, if it is a form of 
self-knowledge that allows for actions to be classified as ‘sinful’, ‘blameworthy’, and so on, then 
the inculcation of strategic ignorance should be a way to insulate oneself from them.  
 
Voluntariness 
The first step toward addressing this worry is to identify the common element among our various 
ways of describing someone’s behaviour so as to identify them as an appropriate target of praise 
or blame. A first step toward doing this is to note the different forms of excuse that we take to  
show a person not to have sinned, or not to have acted in a manner deserving of blame. For 
example, I cannot be blamed for ruining your cake if I had no way to know that you kept your 
salt in sugar bags and sugar in salt shakers. On the other hand, I can be blamed for missing your 
 
44 ‘On Being in Good Faith’, in M. Geach and L. Gormally, eds., Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on 
Religion, Philosophy and Ethics by G. E. M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008), 101-112; at. p. 101. 
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piano recital if I was dragged away by a group of ruffians, just so long as I had paid those 
ruffians to drag me to the movies so that I’d have an excuse to skip the recital.45 For Anscombe, 
what explains this pattern is that notions like sin and blame do not require us to attribute the 
action to a person simply qua physical body (something that we can do in the first case and not 
in the second), but rather to their rational will.46 It is attributing an action to the will that grounds 
the application of concepts like guilt and sin. In her early manuscript, ‘On Being in Good Faith’, 
Anscombe introduces the term voluntary as a shorthand for what makes an action subject to this 
form of attribution.47 As Anscombe uses this term, to ‘ascribe to the will and to call voluntary are 
the same’.48 
Importantly, this use of the word ‘voluntary’ differs from the use according to which the 
voluntariness of an action is incompatible with its having been coerced or performed under 
 
45 For the latter case see G.E.M. Anscombe ‘Sin: the McGivney Lectures’, in Geach and Gormally, eds., 
Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics by G. E. M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2008), 117-156; at p. 129. 
46 In her archival materials Anscombe ties this idea of a rational agent to a condition of ‘callability to 
account’ (Archive, 6, File 209, pp. 25-27). On her view, only rational agents can ‘give an answer or account’ for 
what they did, and so only they can be subject to this special type of responsibility.  
47 Anscombe’s use of the word ‘voluntary’ changes somewhat during the period we are exploring. In 
Intention, she uses the contrast between the ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ first to mark the difference between 
‘purely physical’ bodily movements like peristalsis or a reflex kick (Intention, pp. 14-15; and cf. pp. 23-24 and 32-
33), and later on the voluntary is contrasted with the intentional according to (a) whether movements are absent-
minded or ‘considered by the agent’ (p. 89) and (b) whether the agent’s doing something is either a ‘known 
concomitant result of [their] intentional action’ or something the agent does not do but which ‘happens to their 
delight’ (ibid.). Finally, Anscombe acknowledges that we sometimes use ‘involuntary’ to describe things that a 
person ‘regrets “having” to do’, though she adds that ‘“reluctant” would be the more commonly used word’ (p. 90).  
By contrast, in her writings from the early 60s Anscombe continues to see the voluntary as broader than the 
intentional, but now ties the concept far more explicitly to concepts like sin, responsibility and blame (see, e.g., ‘On 
Being in Good Faith’, p. 105). Anscombe’s later writings, e.g. in her McGivney lectures, largely follow the latter 
treatment, but with some important refinements. 
48 'On Being in Good Faith', p. 110. In one of her archival files Anscombe gives an extended articulation of 
this definition by using ‘free’ as an intermediary concept. She writes: ‘voluntary behaviour is behaviour in respect of 
which the behaver is free. To be free is to be in a situation of possibility of determining something to accord with 
one's will’ (Archive, Box 9, File 304, p. 1). She goes to tie this notion of ‘will’ to humans, writing that ‘if we speak 
of desire instead of will here we erect a modified or half-way concept of freedom which we can apply to animals 
other than the human kind’ (ibid.). 
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duress.49 In her 1989 McGivney lectures, Anscombe is explicit that in her writings the word 
‘voluntary’ is ‘being used in a specially broad way’ such that ‘we do not say that acts done under 
threat are not voluntary’.50 Similarly, in one of her unpublished manuscripts Anscombe explicitly 
distinguishes her notion of the voluntary from the notion that Aristotle appeals to in saying that a 
ship’s crew who throws cargo overboard during a storm in order to lessen the weight of the ship 
will do this only involuntarily.51 
For now, let’s stipulate the definition of voluntary as that which can be attributed to the 
will in a way that holds the agent responsible, and set aside the question of whether the term 
should be defined in this way. For we can accept this stipulated definition without agreeing with 
Anscombe that actions done under duress are not voluntary. That is because one could defend the 
substantive philosophical position that agents are not responsible for what they do under threat. 
Perhaps the fact that one was acting under threat is sufficient to block attribution to a person’s 
will.52 But Anscombe wants us to resist this restrictive conception of responsibility. Just as a 
need for a transplant would not justify killing another person to harvest her organs, so too a 
person can be blamed for murdering someone, even if she does so because of a gun to her head.  
 
49 An important articulation of this alternative concept of consent appears in the Nuremberg Code, which 
states that voluntariness requires choices to be made ‘without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, 
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion’. Indeed, some have criticised Anscombe on 
precisely the grounds that her concept of the voluntary extends to actions done under threat. For example, in the 
course of challenging Anscombe’s concept of voluntariness John Hyman concludes that ‘it is clear that coercion and 
voluntariness are opposed, where the patient of an act is concerned, because whether an act is voluntary on the part 
of the patient depends on whether it is done with her consent, and a sufficiently grave threat vitiates consent’ 
(Action, Knowledge, and Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 88-89). This occurs within a wider 
critique of philosophers who have neglected what Hyman argues is the essentially ethical character of the concept of 
voluntary action (ibid., pp. 76-77). However, as we argue below, Anscombe’s own view at least by the 1960s was 
that to define something in terms of the voluntary is to bring it under an ethical concept, to appeal to notions of what 
agents can and ought to do and think. In this respect, then, Hyman’s position does not present a meaningful contrast 
with Anscombe’s. For discussion of Hyman’s critique with reference to Anscombe’s position in Intention, see John 
Schwenkler, Anscombe’s Intention: A Guide (New York: Oxford Unversity Press, 2019), pp. 202-203. 
50 ‘Sin’, p. 127. 
51 Archive, Box 9, File 304, p. 2; and for Aristotle, see Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapter 1.  
52 Robert Nozick defends position like this in ‘Coercion’ (in Socratic Puzzles (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), at p. 38). 
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Similarly, a Christian will hold that apostasy is sinful even when the alternative is certain 
martyrdom. This is not to deny that in some cases the presence of a threat might count as a 
sufficient excuse for acting in a way that would otherwise be sinful. For instance, if someone 
holds a gun to my head and tells me to take a watch while leaving the store, then I shouldn’t be 
blamed if I do what they say. But that is not because we should not attribute this choice to my 
will. Rather, it is because we recognise my choice as an appropriate response to the 
circumstances I was in.  
It should go without saying that when Anscombe says that voluntary actions are those 
that are attributable to an agent’s will, she is not suggesting anything Cartesian. It is not as 
though we can look at two actions, find that only the second issued from a peculiar interior 
movement of the mind (a ‘bare willing,’ perhaps), and thus find the agent responsible for only 
the second act.53 Indeed, there will be times where ‘the very existence of will ... may consist in 
nothing but some particular action itself’.54 Rather, to attribute an action to an agent’s will is 
simply to attribute the action to a person qua rational animal. That is, it is to represent the action 
as something for which the agent is responsible.55 
 
53 For discussion of this sort of position, see Intention, §§19 and 25; and ‘Sin’, pp. 129 and 137-8. 
54 Archive, Box 9, File 304, p. 1 
55 One needs to be careful using the word ‘responsible’ in discussing Anscombe’s work. In much of her 
archival content she distinguishes between three levels of responsibility (e.g. Archive, Box 8, File 290, pp. 23-30; 
Box 8, File 292, pp. 5-17; and Box F5, File 509, pp. 115-135). She also articulates this distinction in her final draft 
of the paper ‘Murder and the Morality of Euthanasia’ in Geach and Gormally, eds., Human Life, Action, and Ethics: 
Essays by G. E. M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), 261-278; at pp. 261-262. On her view, there is a 
first level of responsibility that consists just in having one’s physical body be a cause of an occurrence. Thus either 
I, or a boulder, could be the cause of an infant’s death if dropped from a sufficient height. The second level of 
responsibility involves what she calls ‘answerability’, or being such that one may be called to account for what 
happened. This is only possible for rational agents who are able to justify or excuse their actions, but it does not 
entail blame or guilt, which she sees as arising only at a third level. In short, third level responsibility means that an 
act is attributable to the agent’s will, while second level responsibility means that it is a candidate for such 
attribution, though it could be that the agent has a good excuse. For Anscombe, this concept of second level 
responsibility depends on that of responsibility at the third level. We could have the concept of guilt without any 
idea of excusing conditions, but we cannot have the idea of being in a position to require an excuse without having 
the concept of guilt. Anscombe thinks it is this third level of responsibility which grounds the concept of merit (in 
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This definition makes it clear why what a person thinks has a bearing on whether she acts 
voluntarily in doing a certain thing. The claim not to have known that one was doing something 
is taken to provide at least prima facie grounds for withholding blame for that action. As we will 
discuss below, however, it is not in every case that ignorance of an action suffices to show that a 
person was not responsible for what she did. The real picture is considerably more complicated 
than that. 
 
Guilt and Sin 
The question ‘When does ignorance excuse?’ is central to both ‘On Being in Good Faith’ and 
‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’. We can motivate this question by beginning with a simple 
case. If I give a peanut butter and jelly sandwich to a child for lunch after being told by his 
parents that the child has no known allergies, then I am not guilty of killing the child or 
otherwise responsible for his death, even by negligence, should the child undergo a deadly 
anaphylactic shock (assuming I do all in my power to save the child after he goes into 
anaphylaxis). This is the case even though giving peanut butter to a child with a severe peanut 
allergy has a good chance of resulting in the child’s death. We can easily construct alternative 
cases where one murders a child by knowingly giving them a sandwich to induce anaphylaxis. 
However, in our original case I am not responsible for any wrongdoing. 
Anscombe identifies two mistakes that can be prompted by this observation. First, 
noticing the way that ignorance exonerates in the example just discussed, one might conclude 
that a person cannot do something voluntarily if the person is ignorant of the fact she is doing 
this. Applied to the case just discussed, the thought would be that because I did not know I was 
 
the context of praise or reward) as well as blame and sin. Here, we will use ‘responsibility’ to refer to the concept at 
this third level.  
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killing the child in giving him the sandwich, I am not responsible for having killed him. 
Similarly, one might continue, because I did not know I was doing anything wrong, therefore I 
am not guilty of any voluntary wrongdoing.  
Yet this cannot be right. For surely not all ignorance excuses! Suppose, for example, that 
I knew that the child was severely allergic to peanuts but failed to understand that killing by 
peanut was murder, perhaps because I had the bizarre thought that this would be a natural death 
since peanuts are naturally a food. No one would think that this bit of ignorance constitutes an 
excuse for what I did. My ignorance about the nature of murder would not excuse me from the 
charge of it. This result is consonant with what we found in Part II. An act is not an act of murder 
if the agent did not know that they were killing someone, but it can still be an act of murder if the 
agent did not know that their action was properly classified as such.   
This then suggests the second mistake Anscombe thinks we are prone to make. One 
might, considering these two cases together, conclude that classifying an action as voluntary is 
like classifying it as an act of theft. Voluntariness requires the agent to know the circumstantial 
facts of her action, but does not require the agent to know the classificatory facts. In the context 
of sin and guilt, the distinction between classificatory and circumstantial dependency maps 
directly onto the distinction between law and circumstance. And thus we seem to reach the 
doctrine that ignorance of circumstance excuses, but ignorance of law does not.  
Anscombe has two reasons for rejecting this simple analysis of the relation between 
knowledge and voluntariness or responsibility. First, while she agrees that there are many cases 
in which ignorance of circumstances means that a person is not responsible for something she 
does, she argues that not all ignorance of circumstance has this effect. Suppose, for example, that 
I work at a summer camp, and during staff training they have a meeting about student safety and 
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allergies. Thinking the meeting sounds boring, I skip it and so fail to learn that several children 
attending the camp have deadly peanut allergies, and as such we are forbidden from serving any 
peanut products. Having skipped the meeting, I, in ignorance, kill a child by serving peanut 
butter and jelly sandwiches to my class. Here, even though I am ignorant of the circumstantial 
fact that my action will endanger the child, it remains appropriate to hold me responsible for the 
child’s death. That is because, as a camp counselor, I ought to have gone to the safety meeting. 
Anscombe puts this by saying that though in this case I was ignorant of the circumstances of my 
action, that ignorance itself was voluntary, in the sense of being attributable to my will. 
In addition to arguing that we are sometimes blameworthy for ignorance of the 
circumstances of our action, Anscombe also rejects the claim that classificatory ignorance, or 
ignorance of law, is never an excusing condition.56 Her  clearest example of guiltless, and 
therefore exculpatory, ignorance of law comes in ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, where 
asks us to imagine a ‘public executioner who has private knowledge of a condemned man’s 
innocence’ that he is unable to use to publicly exonerate the man.57 Suppose that this executioner 
knows there has been a procedurally fair trial, and the man has been deemed guilty by a rightful 
legal authority properly empowered to kill by execution. To kill such a person would be to kill an 
innocent man, yet Anscombe thinks it is a difficult question whether executing the person, in 
such a case, is murder. As such, if the executioner ‘forms a bona fide judgement that he can or 
should execute the man, and acts accordingly, then murder cannot be imputed to him’ even if in 
fact our executioner does indeed commit an act of murder. 
 
56 As is so often the case, Anscombe draws here on ideas that she finds in St. Thomas Aquinas. On the 
difficulty of knowing the dictates of eternal law as applied to certain difficult cases, see Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 
q. 93, a. 2, c, and q. 94, a. 4, c. And on the possibility of voluntary ignorance of the sort just discussed, see ST, 
IaIIae, q. 6, a. 8, c. In the last article Aquinas includes a third possibility that Anscombe does not mention, namely 
that a person’s ignorance may be voluntary if it is the result of a desire not to know a certain thing. 
57 For this case see ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, p. 7. 
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In the case just considered, if the executioner is ignorant then his ignorance is not of 
circumstance, but of law. He knows every relevant fact, but mistakenly, and reasonably, errs in 
his practical reasoning. Now, Anscombe agrees with all the ‘best writers’ from Aristotle on, that 
‘where it was easy to know the law, then there is no possibility of exoneration’.58 However, she 
does not think that this same analysis extends to the ‘recondite parts of the law of nature; 
decisions about right and wrong involving remote and unobvious conclusions from the main 
outlines of the law’.59 Anscombe’s case of the executioner differs from our second version of the 
peanut case, because a belief that killing children by peanut is not murder is not a belief one can 
come to faultlessly. One could not, in any real-life circumstances, be involuntarily ignorant of 
the fact that causing a child to die by allergic reaction is murderous, and so any such ignorance 
would be attributable to a failing of one’s rational will. By contrast, the executioner could have 
come to his mistaken belief entirely faultlessly, and so could be guiltlessly ignorant of this 
recondite part of the moral law.60  
This account allows us to vindicate the exculpatory role of ignorance, but without making 
room for the idea that strategic inculcation of ignorance is a possible way of keeping oneself 
guiltless. When ignorance excuses, this is because of the way it decouples an act from the agent’s 
will.61 However, voluntary ignorance could not decouple an act from an agent’s will because the 
 
58 Ibid. p.7 
59 ‘On Being in Good Faith’, p. 108. 
60 To the extent that Anscombe has an argument for the claim that the execution case could involve 
involuntary ignorance, it seems to be that great Catholic theologians have, in good faith, disagreed about the case, 
and thus it is unreasonable to expect a less educated layperson to parse the moral law successfully in such 
conceptual extremities. 
61 A complete exploration of why ignorance decouples act from the will is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, you can begin to see why if you accept Anscombe’s view that it is through her practical knowledge that a 
human being acts, and so since ignorance compromises that knowledge, it compromises the capacity for willing to 
manifest in action.  
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ignorance itself is now willful.62  Strategically inculcated ignorance cannot render a person 
guiltless for what otherwise would be wrongdoing, because strategically inculcated ignorance is 
ignorance that the agent herself is responsible for. 
At this point, however, a concern about circularity arises. On Anscombe’s view, acts are 
voluntary only if we either know or are voluntarily ignorant of the character of our actions. To 
say this is to employ the notion of the voluntary in our definition of voluntariness! Anscombe is 
well aware of this problem, and recognises that to make good on her account she will need to 
articulate a notion of the voluntary that can make sense of both voluntary action and voluntary 
ignorance. This, in turn, depends on an account of the nature of omissions, which in the end will 
yield the thesis that voluntary ignorance is omitting to know. 
 
Omissions 
In both ‘On Being in Good Faith’ and ‘The Two Kinds of Error in Action’, Anscombe begins her 
discussion of omissions by looking at what goes on when we attribute the sinking of a ship to a 
pilot. If a pilot steers a ship into an iceberg, then we would say the pilot sank the ship. But we 
would also blame the pilot for sinking the ship if at the time it hit an iceberg the pilot was 
supposed to be navigating the ship, yet was taking a nap as the ship went into dangerous waters. 
So some omissions, like the pilot’s failure to navigate, are such that we attribute their 
consequences to the agent. And this seems to have something to do with the special role of the 
 
62 In an archival manuscript titled ‘Moral Action Descriptions’ Anscombe draws out this connection 
explicitly, noting that omissions are voluntary just in so far as they can be attributed to the will: ‘Will, given the 
possibility of “Let it be so” and also of “Let it not be so” being as it were said to the possibility envisaged, is (again 
as it were) the actual saying of one or the other ... When what is in question is an omission there is likely no action 
which is (as it were) a saying “Let it be so”. The behaviour of omission is voluntary however just because the 
behaver (sic) is or has been in a situation of possibility of making something accord with his will, the 'something' 
being the occurrence or non-occurrence of the act which he omitted to perform’ (Archive, Box 9, File 304, 
typescript pp. 1-2). 
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pilot vis-à-vis the safety of the ship. Perhaps, as a passenger on the ship, like the pilot I could 
have gone to the helm and begun navigating rather than taking my afternoon nap. Yet we do not 
attribute the sinking of the ship to me in the same way we attribute it to the pilot. To the 
question, ‘Why did the ship sink?’, the answer ‘Because the pilot was not navigating’ is a 
perfectly good reply, whereas ‘Because the passengers were not navigating’ is not. What is the 
difference at work here? 
 According to Anscombe, the operative difference is simply that it was the pilot’s job to 
navigate the ship, which is just to say that the pilot ought to have been navigating at the time he 
was not. So one necessary condition for being a person who, by omission, sank the ship or 
caused it to sink is that one ought to have done the thing that one omitted to do. This is not the 
only condition, however. For example, suppose a saboteur has ruined the machinery of the helm, 
rendering the boat unnavigable. In such a situation, we would no longer say that the pilot sank 
the ship by failing to navigate, since while it is true that pilots ought to navigate their ships, in 
this case the pilot was unable to navigate. (This is not to say that the pilot wouldn’t deserve 
censure for taking a nap while the ship was in dangerous waters, or for failing to notice that the 
ship’s machinery had been ruined.) Similarly, Anscombe thinks that at least in one sense we 
would not attribute the sinking of the ship to a pilot who died of a heart attack while piloting, 
whereas we might still attribute the sinking of the ship to a pilot who committed suicide while on 
duty.63 The difference is that in one case the pilot could still have navigated the ship, while in the 
 
63 We say ‘in one sense’ because Anscombe thinks we often will identify what is responsible for some 
event without speaking of moral responsibility (see ‘On Being in Good Faith’, p. 110). Thus, we might say ‘a rope 
saved someone’s life by breaking at a critical moment’, not because the rope had an obligation to hold, and it was up 
to the rope whether it would hold. But just because ‘ropes are meant to hold’ and ‘we could not have told that it 
must break just then’. It is in this sense of responsibility that we the pilot who died of a heart attack ‘could after all 
be said to have lost the ship’. This broader notion of ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is discussed at length in many of Anscombe’s 
unpublished writings. She glosses the ‘ought’ description as ‘it was antecedently going to be done, or should have 
been so, or would have been according to some rule, or it would naturally or normally be expected to be. Or it was 
needed for some purpose in hand’ (Archive, Box 7, File 256, p. 2). This is significant because it can explain how 
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other they could not. The second necessary condition on sinking the ship by omitting to navigate 
it is that one could have done what one omitted to do.64  
 Anscombe uses these examples to argue that the failure to do something is voluntary—
that is, it is an omission—if and only if one ‘could and ought to’ have done what one failed to 
do.65 And she applies this account to the concept that worried us above, i.e. that of voluntary 
ignorance. On her account, to be voluntarily ignorant of something, pertaining either to 
circumstances or to the law, is simply for it to be the case that one one could and ought to have 
known that thing, which in fact one failed to know.66 
  
IV. Turning To Ethics 
This chapter has explored how Anscombe’s understanding of what is distinctive in the 
description of human action developed during the decade following the publication of Intention. 
It is generally understood that Anscombe concluded in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that much of 
 
omissions can sometimes be morally obligatory (even though in such a case clearly one ought not perform the action 
one is omitting to perform). Perhaps a king’s chef should ruin the potatoes by failing to add salt in order to protest an 
unjust salt tax levied on the people. Because it is the chef’s job to add salt, we can still classify this as an omission.   
64 In her archival materials Anscombe gives another case where an omission would not be blameworthy. 
She notes that often omissions are blameworthy ‘but not when what is omitted is itself a great wrong’ (Archive, Box 
7, File 240, p. 1). This is significant, because it helps address a potential moral conflict. In a case where you must 
kill one to save another, Anscombe argues it is not injustice to let the latter die. The mere fact that I can kill someone 
by omitting to save them does not, therefore, give rise to a conflict in our duties not to kill. How does this fit in the 
schema? It is not just that the agent has no obligation to save the person—for after all, if another way to save the 
person presents itself you are obligated to take it. Nor is it just that the agent cannot save the person, as they can do 
this by killing the former. Rather, we need to see the two requirements in conjunction: it is not the case that the 
agent can and ought to save the person, since the only ways the agent can save the person involve doing things they 
ought not do. Anscombe thinks that distinctions of this sort are important to resist certain utilitarian conclusions 
(Archive, Box 7, File 256, pp. 8-12). 
65 The notion of what could be ‘done’ should be understood as broader than actions. For Anscombe thinks 
one can omit, not just actions, but omissions as well. Suppose I am supposed to type up a list of event attendees to 
add to our company’s marketing listserv, but I am asked to omit currently employees of the company. If I copy 
down Barbara’s email, not realizing she works in H.R., then I failed to omit her name (Archive, Box 7, File 256, p. 
1). Similarly, as a chef I could fail to omit anchovies from the caesar salad recipe when preparing a dish for a 
vegetarian customer.  
66 Anscombe often uses the language of what is ‘possible and necessary’ instead of what one ‘can and 
ought to’ do. She also once uses the language of ‘possible and reasonable’ (Archive, Box 8, File 292, p. 5). 
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moral reasoning was corrupted, not because of mistakes in values, but because of a corrupt and 
confused understanding of intentional action. Intention is then seen as her attempt to counteract 
that corruption.  
 What we have argued here, however, is that Anscombe saw this project as going well 
beyond the territory covered in Intention. Mistakes about the nature of intention and intentional 
action are only one part of the story. By resolving these mistakes we can come to identify a 
distinctive way in which humans, unlike other animals, are able to know what they are doing in 
acting. Because we can know what we do in acting, ways of acting are opened up to us that 
circumstantially depend on this agential self-knowledge. And because we can act in this 
distinctively self-knowing way, it is possible to attribute our actions not just to our bodies but to 
our rational wills. Finally, it is because humans, unlike other animals, can have their excellences 
and failures properly attributed to their wills that we are creatures susceptible to ethical 
descriptions like virtue and sin.  
 It is thus worth emphasizing that what we have presented here is still firmly within the 
realm of philosophical psychology. This chapter has been an investigation of how the 
applicability of certain forms of action description depends on the agent’s own thoughts and 
rational capacities. It remains, for all that we have argued, an open question which of those 
actions descriptions are descriptions of morally good or bad kinds of acts. For Anscombe, 
murder, because it involves an understanding of its own circumstantial requirements, essentially 
entails moral responsibility. But it remains a substantive philosophical question whether murder 
is always wrong, or if sometimes in murdering a person is instead responsible, and so 
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